Rehmonnya Institute of Civic Engagement
The Mon Unity Party (MUP), the political party of the Mon people, will participate in the upcoming (2025) election to be held by the Myanmar military junta. On November 20th, the Mon Unity Party’s election policy positions were broadcast on Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV), which is controlled by the military junta, and were also reposted on the party’s official social media page.
Mon In the period following the military coup, Mon State transitioned its fuel distribution system from Yangon (Thilawa Port) to Puma International Port Terminal (Yaza Min Port) in Mudon Township, in a decentralized import approach.[1] This system change, coupled with insufficient fuel supplies, illegal exports to border areas, and administrative weaknesses, has led to fuel shortages and price increases. Despite the military council’s Ministry of Energy stating that it would distribute fuel at affordable prices, the complete lack of effective oversight on the ground and the delay in implementing even the State Chief Minister’s directives for up to two weeks[2] highlight a significant decline in administrative efficiency.
The political crisis in Myanmar continues to be a major issue challenging the unity and centrality of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a regional organization. A review of international responses between October 21 and November 19, 2025, particularly the actions of ASEAN and its member states, reveals that the Myanmar issue remains an important topic on the ASEAN agenda. This paper will analyze and present ASEAN’s collective decisions regarding the Myanmar issue, the individual positions of member states such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and the response of the State Administration Council.
As the election date approaches, the coup military junta is launching intense military offensives nationwide, claiming it is for regional stability. Similarly, the military junta’s offensives are increasingly seen in both northern and southern Mon State. Along with these offensives, the military junta’s use of aircraft for airstrikes has also been observed in the northern part of the state. However, the military junta’s use of aircraft for attacks has not been observed in the southern part of the state. The No. (8) Union Highway in southern Mon State is important for Myanmar, as well as for the military junta. However, the military junta has relinquished control of the Ye-Thanbyuzayat section of that road since the coup (2022), and it has been under the control of the Mon and Karen revolutionary allied forces.
In Thaton Township, northern Mon State, the military junta’s column was attacked for two consecutive days. On the night of October 22, near the Moekaung Village junction on the Yangon-Mawlamyine road, and on October 23, near Yeway Village, they were ambushed by a joint force of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Additionally, on October 25, near Dok Yat Village in Bilin Township, a clash occurred between the military junta’s patrol unit and the joint KNLA forces for about half an hour on the Yangon-Mawlamyine road.[1]
From October 14 to November 12, there were (9) villages in northern Mon State that were attacked using aircraft by the military junta, and (3) villages that were attacked by drones and other aerial means. All of these attacks occurred within Brigade (1) territory of the Karen National Union (KNU), specifically in Kyaikto Township’s Win Kan, Kyauk Phyar, Nat Sin[2], and in Thaton Township’s Yeway, Upper Naung Ka Tot, Kaw Hlaing, the base of Win Phone Mountain, Mi Chaung Eain, Shwe Kyi, and Yae Twin Phyu villages.[3]
Although there were no aircraft attacks by the military junta in southern Mon State, aerial attacks continue. Since October 26, the military junta has launched an offensive with superior forces to the vicinity of Katunsi Village, in Kyaikmaraw Township, where joint Mon and Karen revolutionary forces are based. Consequently, the revolutionary forces withdrew from that location. Locals report that after regaining control of the cement factory (MCL), the military junta has been conducting aerial attacks on surrounding villages from the factory grounds.
“The military commission is stationed near the cement factory. From there, they are using drones and heavy artillery to fire at the village. What they are firing is falling and exploding near the village and houses,”
“The military commission is stationed near the cement factory. From there, they are using drones and heavy artillery to fire at the village. What they are firing is falling and exploding near the village and houses,” according to a local resident of Kyaikmayaw t, as reported by the Independent Mon News Agency.[4]
Additionally, on November 10, heavy artillery fire also occurred from Infantry Battalion (591), a military group based in Kyaung Ywa village, Ye Township. Regarding battles, only two guerrilla operations by the Ye Balu Battalion were recorded in Ye Township, southern Mon State. These include the October 27 attack on the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) checkpoint at the entrance of Hnin Son village, and the November 10 attack on Infantry Battalion (591) in Kyaung Ywa village.[5]
In the northern Ye Township, the coup military junta has been reinforcing its forces since the beginning of last October and conducting troop advances along the Ye-Thanbyuzayat section of the No. (8) Union Highway. The northern part of Ye Township stretches from Ayut Taung-Mote Kanin to Hni Ka Rein junction-Aung Thayar and is also the base area for the military junta’s Infantry Battalions (343), (587), (588), Light Infantry Battalion (106), and No. (317) Artillery Battalion. In addition, the military junta’s proxy, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), also has small gate outposts in Hnint Soe and San Pya villages.
After the coup, the Ayut Taung People’s Militia, led by U Lin Oo, the administrator of Ayut Taung village, also emerged, and its manpower is gradually increasing. The group’s gate outposts are mostly located on the No. (8) Highway and on the connecting road between Ayut Taung-Taung Bon-Thaung Pyin villages. Last month, when troops advanced into Way Ya Hain village, Kyauk Ywar village group, Ye Township, both the military junta, the Ayut Taung People’s Militia, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) participated.
“In that column, there is also the Ayut Taung group who speak Mon language,” said one of the porters forced to work during the military column operation in Way Ya Hai village, in a Mon language, to whom (RICE) was able to contact.“During the offensive by the SAC [State Administration Council] column, when they came up to Way Ya Hai, these guys were there, collecting money roughly on No. 8 Highway,” was said after the attack by the Yae Bi Lu battalion on the DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) gate camp at the entrance of Hnin Son village on October 27.[6] Therefore, it can be seen that the military group was able to build up its strength in Ye Township by exploiting the local people. Thus, these groups are likely to be involved with the military group in regaining control of the Ye-Thanbyuzayat section of Highway No. 8, which has been out of their control for years in the northern Ye Township.
Regaining control of this part of the road is very important for the military group, which has been mainly relying on sea routes for years. Only by controlling this road section can the security of Ye and Thanbyuzayat townships, which participated in the second election, be guaranteed. Similarly, the Mawlamyine-Dawei railway line, which runs parallel to Highway No. 8, will also be reopened from its closure. Therefore, it is said that the Ye-Thanbyuzayat section is very important for the military group in terms of politics, military affairs, and economy. Currently, the military group is regularly using the Panda port in A Sin village, a coastal village, to replenish everything from food to manpower, and locals say that they occasionally use the beach, Kaw Dut, and Ni Ka Yote village ports as well.
In recent months, compared to the scale of the entire Mon State, the battle operations of the various revolutionary forces fighting against the coup military junta have decreased. In other words, it can be seen that they are only able to carry out intermittent attacks and guerrilla warfare, which are no more than defensive actions. On the other hand, the military junta has also been relentlessly conducting offensives with unwavering persistence. This may be because there are only over (40) days left until the election. The Ye-Thanbyuzayat road section, which was involved in the military junta’s offensive, can currently be described as a situation of military stalemate on both sides. The Ye-Thanbyuzayat road section is extremely important for the revolutionary joint forces, as it is for the military junta, both militarily and in terms of prestige. For the military junta, the offensive on that road section is in line with the principle of “even if the goal is not achieved, the goal must not be abandoned.” Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the coup military junta will be able to control the Ye-Thanbyuzayat road section in the coming months.
The military junta/ group, taking advantage of the blockade of legitimate business channels and the deterioration of the rule of law, has not only virtually legalized gambling operations but also directly profits from the people. Details can be found in the following socio-economic review of Mon State.
The socio-economic situation in Mon State is observed to be distorted under two crises due to the policies of the military council. On one hand, the administrative mechanism is being used to directly extort profit from the public. On the other hand, official economic channels are being blocked, directly threatening the local community’s livelihood . This analysis will examine these two interconnected forms of oppression—the country’s systemic decay and a governance system that treats the public as victim.
The security forces under the military commission have deviated from their duty to protect the rule of law and have transformed into a mechanism that systematically oppresses and exploits the people. This section will examine the methods, targets, and broad consequences of their systematic extortion and forced conscription practices.
Military junta-controlled forces in Kyaikto Township are extorting money primarily from local youth. Methods used include arresting and accusing young men riding motorcycles together of violating local orders. According to locals, nearly 20 young people from Taikaw, Kothtine, Khalun, Kyaikkatha villages, and Kawsan Naing and southern wards have recently been subjected to such arrests and extortion.
Those arrested are being asked to pay between 1 million and 15 million kyats per person, and if they cannot pay the requested amount, they are forcibly conscripted into military service. A local source’s information, “The military, including the police, and members of military security forces divide the spoils proportionally,” attests that this act may not be mere corruption but a systematically organized exploitati
on system.[1]
(b)Unprotected war-displaced civilians
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing to Mon State from other conflict areas, including Shan, Kachin, Rakhine, Sagaing, and Magway, are being systematically targeted. The requirement to register guests, a seemingly official procedure, has been transformed from a measure intended to protect displaced people into a tool of oppression, easily exploited to create a list for targeting by those in power. Furthermore, discriminatory practices exist, such as limiting individuals with Shan State registration (13/…) to staying in only three designated guesthouses.
The severity of the situation is illustrated by the case of one family who arrived with complete documentation. “They released two out of five people. I heard they took the other three away,” a local resident said. This incident highlights how no one is safe from the authorities’ lawless actions, even with official documents.[2]
(c) Socio-economic Impacts
The above actions have broad socio-economic consequences. They create an environment of fear and panic among the public and severely restrict the freedom of movement of young men who are able to work. This creates a situation where the economic situation of a family is directly linked to the safety and freedom of its members. This is not just ordinary corruption, but a group of people holding state power directly profiting from the resources of its people and becoming socially controlling. This is directly related to policy oppression that is cutting off the economic lifeline of an entire region.
Border trade plays a strategically important role in the economy of Mon State. We will analyze in detail how the military commission’s closure of formal trade routes has affected normal business and created a complex, costly, and illegal smuggling network.
In August, the military council closed the Myanmar-Thai Friendship Bridge No. 2 in Myawaddy, a key point for importing goods from Thailand. This action halted the flow of legal trade and significantly impacted the local economy.
(b)Costly Illegal Goods Flow
With the official routes closed, traders are forced to use illegal routes such as Payathonzu-Kyaikkasan-Kyaikmayaw and Myawaddy-Tiktokko-Mawlamyine. To get goods through these routes, they have to pay taxes and fees to multiple organizations, including military council officials, Karen revolutionary forces, and Mon revolutionary forces.
As a result, transportation costs have risen significantly. For example, the fee paid for one item has increased from the previous 5,000 or 10,000 kyats to more than 50,000 kyats.[3]
This situation has had different effects on businesses. Large traders with good connections and strong financial resources can afford the high costs and overcome complex bribery issues to keep their businesses running. However, small traders without connections or capital have had to suspend operations.
Despite the blockades and high costs, Mon State has avoided the severe shortages and exorbitant price increases seen in other regions because goods continue to flow through illegal routes. However, this situation is only a form of unstable local economic survival. According to one truck driver, “In this era, we are just grateful that the goods arrive,” a comment that reflects the precarious situation of the public’s economic sphere.
Exploiting the deterioration of the rule of law, the Military Council is significantly impacting the social and economic lives of the people by virtually legalizing gambling circles. These actions demonstrate that the state prioritizes self-interest over the betterment of public life.
Gambling circles have been rapidly opening under the guise of pagoda festivals and Zat Pwe (traditional performance) events in most townships of Mon State, including Mawlamyine, Mudon, Chaungzon, Kyaikmayaw, and Paung. These activities are being permitted by the police, military, and administrators under the Military Council, who are taking large sums of money from business people. In some areas, the leasing of gambling circles with five-year contracts[4] proves that this is not just short-term corruption, but
a long-term planned act.
The worst part is that “the police force, People’s Militia… are providing security.” This action transforms the state security apparatus, which is supposed to protect the people, into an organization that protects illegal businesses that destroy social life, thus reversing their fundamental duty.
The following social harms have arisen due to government-approved gambling venues:
Gambling directly affects the economy of local people. Due to gambling losses, family problems such as spousal quarrels are becoming more common. Some lose to the point of having to mortgage their homes and cars, and many have left for Thailand after going bankrupt. Findings from the review suggest that Mon State is trapped in a complex crisis caused by the military commission’s style of governance. The military junta, which holds the power of the state administration, is directly profiting from the people, and its policies are undermining the legitimate economy. It can be seen as a form of governance that directly sacrifices the economic viability and social well-being of the public to enrich a small group of rulers. Therefore, as long as the coup military junta does not relinquish power, the lives of innocent people will have to endure suffering.
