Introduction: A Broken Promise of Peace
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) stands as a landmark, yet ultimately failed, initiative in Myanmar’s long and troubled history of ethnic armed conflict. Signed with the ambitious goal of ending decades of civil war through political dialogue, the agreement has since collapsed, rendered obsolete by the very military that once co-signed it. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the NCA’s origins, the structural and political challenges that plagued its implementation, and the key events—particularly the 2021 military coup—that led to its definitive breakdown.
the NCA was defined by a fundamental tension: the divergence between its stated goal of achieving a federal democratic union and the conflicting strategic objectives of its primary stakeholders. While the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) sought a genuine restructuring of the state, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) remained committed to a framework that preserved its political dominance under the 2008 Constitution.
At its core, the NCA was defined by a fundamental tension: the divergence between its stated goal of achieving a federal democratic union and the conflicting strategic objectives of its primary stakeholders. While the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) sought a genuine restructuring of the state, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) remained committed to a framework that preserved its political dominance under the 2008 Constitution. This inherent contradiction created a fragile process that could not withstand the political shock of the 2021 coup.
Understanding the arc of the NCA—from its hopeful beginnings to its violent end—is not merely an academic exercise. Its failure offers critical lessons for all future peacemaking efforts in Myanmar. Any path forward must reckon with the legacy of this broken promise and the new political realities forged in the aftermath of its collapse.
1. The Genesis of the NCA: A Flawed Foundation (2011-2015)
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement did not emerge in a vacuum. It was a direct product of the political landscape established by the military-drafted 2008 Constitution and the subsequent peace process initiated by the quasi-civilian government of President Thein Sein in 2011. This period was strategically crucial, as the decisions made and the compromises avoided laid the groundwork for the deep-rooted issues that would later undermine the entire agreement.
The Thein Sein government’s peace process was an attempt to manage the fallout from the military’s earlier policy, which demanded that all EAOs transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or People’s Militias under Tatmadaw command—a key provision of the 2008 Constitution.
The Thein Sein government’s peace process was an attempt to manage the fallout from the military’s earlier policy, which demanded that all EAOs transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or People’s Militias under Tatmadaw command—a key provision of the 2008 Constitution. This policy had met with limited and coercive success; some groups, such as the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) and factions of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), acquiesced and converted. However, major EAOs—including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Union (KNU), and New Mon State Party (NMSP)—categorically rejected this ultimatum and began preparing for renewed warfare. Faced with the prospect of widespread, coordinated conflict, the government was compelled to launch a new peace initiative, creating a complex institutional architecture to bring the holdouts to the negotiating table.
During this formative period, both the government and the EAOs established a series of representative bodies to formalize the dialogue:
- Government-Established Bodies:
- Union Peace Central Committee (UPCC): The highest-level policy-making body, chaired by the President.
- Union Peace and Work Committee (UPWC): The primary negotiating body tasked with implementing the peace process.
- Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC): A technical support and advisory body intended to facilitate dialogue.
- EAO-Established Bodies:
- United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC): An early political alliance of EAOs seeking to form a united front in negotiations.
- Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT): A technical team formed by EAOs to collectively draft and negotiate the text of the NCA with the government’s UPWC.
- Senior Delegation (SD): A high-level EAO leadership body that took over final negotiations from the NCCT.
Despite this intricate framework, the process was compromised from the start by the failure of the principle of “all-inclusivity.” The Myanmar military flatly refused to allow three EAOs actively engaged in fighting—the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—to be signatories. This act of exclusion proved to be a foundational flaw. In a show of solidarity, other major armed groups, including the powerful KIA and other key actors like the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and New Mon State Party (NMSP), refused to sign the agreement. This division shattered the vision of a truly “nationwide” ceasefire before it had even begun.
Nevertheless, despite these fundamental disagreements and the boycott by several of the country’s most significant EAOs, a faction of eight armed groups proceeded with the signing, officially launching the NCA era on a fractured and contested foundation.
2. The Signing and Stagnation: An Agreement in Name Only (2015-2020)
The official signing of the NCA on October 15, 2015, was a moment of carefully orchestrated ceremony, yet it could not mask the political realities that would prevent the agreement from gaining meaningful momentum. The period that followed was characterized by procedural activity—a series of conferences and meetings—but a profound lack of substantive implementation, trust-building, or resolution of core political grievances. The agreement existed on paper, but its spirit remained largely absent from the political landscape.
A total of ten EAOs would eventually sign the NCA, with an initial group of eight followed by two more in 2018.
| Signatory Group | Date of Signing |
| Karen National Union (KNU) | October 15, 2015 |
| All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) | October 15, 2015 |
| Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) | October 15, 2015 |
| Chin National Front (CNF) | October 15, 2015 |
| Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) | October 15, 2015 |
| KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC) | October 15, 2015 |
| Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) | October 15, 2015 |
| Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) | October 15, 2015 |
| New Mon State Party (NMSP) | February 13, 2018 |
| Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) | February 13, 2018 |
The NCA process stagnated for several critical reasons, revealing the deep structural impediments to peace.
- Military Dominance: While civilian governments under both President Thein Sein and later Aung San Suu Kyi were the public face of the peace process, ultimate decision-making power remained firmly in the hands of the Tatmadaw. Any proposal or agreement that did not align with the military’s strategic interests was effectively vetoed, sidelining civilian authority and frustrating EAO negotiators.
- Failure of Implementation: Despite the veneer of progress, none of the agreements reached during four sessions of the Union Peace Conference were ever implemented. This created a cycle of discussion without action, completely eroding confidence that the process could deliver tangible political change.
- The 2008 Constitution as a Barrier: The military’s rigid adherence to the 2008 Constitution was the single greatest political obstacle. The constitution guarantees the Tatmadaw a dominant role in politics, including control of key ministries and a quarter of parliamentary seats. This framework was fundamentally incompatible with the EAOs’ core demand for a genuine federal democratic union based on equality and self-determination.
- Lack of Neutral Mediation: The Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC), established to facilitate the talks, was widely viewed by EAOs not as a neutral arbiter but as an agent of the USDP government and the military. This perception fostered deep mistrust, as EAO participants felt the process was managed by actors who were not impartial but were instead serving the interests of their adversary.
The years following the 2015 signing thus exposed the NCA as a fragile process, incapable of resolving the core political disputes at the heart of Myanmar’s civil war. It was an agreement held together by procedure rather than political will, making it profoundly vulnerable to the seismic political shock that was to come.
3. The 2021 Coup: The Irrevocable Fracture
The military coup of February 1, 2021, was the single event that shattered the NCA’s fragile foundation. The Tatmadaw’s seizure of power from the elected civilian government was viewed by key signatories as a complete and blatant repudiation of the agreement’s principles, objectives, and spirit. It demonstrated that the military’s commitment to dialogue was subordinate to its core interest: the preservation of its own power, by force if necessary.
The formal response from leading anti-junta EAOs was swift and unequivocal. Three of the most significant signatories—the Karen National Union (KNU), the Chin National Front (CNF), and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF)—officially declared the NCA null and void. In a joint statement, these groups declared that the military’s actions had destroyed the agreement’s essence, turning it into “wastepaper”.
EAOs and independent analysts cite a series of direct actions by the military’s State Administration Council (SAC) as gross violations of the NCA’s terms, which explicitly required the protection of civilians:
- Violence Against Civilians: The SAC unleashed a brutal crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy protesters across the country, killing, arresting, and torturing unarmed citizens.
- Indiscriminate Military Offensives: The Tatmadaw launched widespread military operations using heavy artillery and airstrikes on civilian areas. In one harrowing example, a SAC airstrike in the Sagaing region killed approximately 200 civilians. In another, an attack on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp near Laiza in Kachin State killed more than 30 people, including children.
- Destruction of the Multi-Stakeholder Framework: A core premise of the NCA was a dialogue process built on a “five-stakeholder” structure: the Government, Parliament, Political Parties, the Tatmadaw, and the EAOs. The coup systematically dismantled this framework by dissolving the elected government and parliament, effectively leaving only the Tatmadaw to dictate the terms of any future engagement.
The coup irrevocably split the NCA signatories and destroyed any remaining semblance of a unified peace process. In its wake, two diametrically opposed narratives emerged, with each side claiming ownership over the agreement’s corpse.
4. The Aftermath: Competing Narratives in a Divided Landscape
In the post-coup environment, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ceased to function as a unified peace process. Instead, it became a contested political tool. The military junta and the revolutionary forces that rose to oppose it promoted starkly different interpretations of the NCA’s status and purpose, reflecting the country’s deep political schism.
4.1 The Junta’s Strategy: The NCA as a Tool for Legitimacy
For the State Administration Council (SAC), continuing to publicly uphold the NCA serves several strategic purposes. It allows the junta to project an image of being a peacemaker to the international community, providing a veneer of legitimacy for its rule. By insisting the NCA is still active, the SAC also maintains a legalistic link to the 2008 Constitution, which it sees as the sole basis for the nation’s political future. This narrative attempts to frame the conflict as a matter of restoring order under an existing agreement, rather than a nationwide revolution against military rule.
The SAC has institutionalized this strategy by holding annual anniversary celebrations for the NCA signing. These events highlight the deep divisions in the international response to the coup. While the United Nations and Western nations have consistently boycotted these ceremonies, representatives from neighboring countries—namely China, India, and Thailand—have attended, lending the junta a degree of regional validation.
4.2 The Revolutionary Position: A Call for a New Paradigm
The anti-junta EAOs have adopted a unified position that the NCA is defunct. This was formalized when six groups—the KNU, CNF, ABSDF, PNLO, NMSP-AD (an anti-junta faction), and LDU—issued a joint statement calling for a full international boycott of the SAC’s NCA anniversary event. By actively lobbying the international community to treat the agreement as void, they argue that participating would grant legitimacy to a military regime that has repeatedly violated its most basic tenets.
The coup has also shattered the original bloc of 10 signatories, leaving it fragmented and largely defunct. The New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) have split into pro- and anti-junta factions. The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) has been reduced to acting as a local militia for the SAC in Sittwe. Among the initial signatories, only the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) remains as a significant, intact armed group that is not engaged in active armed revolution against the junta.
In place of the failed NCA, analysts and revolutionary actors have articulated clear conditions for any new, credible peace process. These preconditions reflect the profound lack of trust in the SAC and the belief that dialogue is impossible under the current circumstances:
- The SAC must immediately cease all attacks on civilians and revolutionary forces and unconditionally release all political prisoners.
- A formal nationwide ceasefire must be declared by the SAC, followed by a new dialogue process facilitated by a genuinely neutral international body, such as ASEAN or the United Nations.
- Peace talks must be held in a neutral third country, free from the coercion and influence of the SAC’s power structures in Naypyidaw.
These competing narratives demonstrate that there is no longer a shared understanding of what peace in Myanmar means, let alone a common path to achieving it.
Conclusion: The Legacy of a Failed Peace Process
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, long before the 2021 coup delivered the final, fatal blow. While the military’s seizure of power was the catalyst for its formal repudiation by key ethnic revolutionary forces, the agreement was built on a foundation fatally flawed by exclusion, a severe power imbalance, and a fundamental, irreconcilable disagreement on the future political structure of the Myanmar state. The Tatmadaw’s vision of a unitary state under its perpetual guardianship, as enshrined in the 2008 Constitution, was never compatible with the EAOs’ aspiration for a genuine federal democracy.
Ultimately, the NCA’s legacy is complex. It failed to bring peace and, in the end, served as a political instrument for a military regime seeking to legitimize its power grab. However, the years of negotiation did create a shared vocabulary and framework for political dialogue that may yet inform future efforts. The process, for all its faults, normalized discussions around federalism and multi-stakeholder engagement. Yet, its intimate association with the 2008 Constitution and its ultimate failure to prevent the coup have rendered the NCA itself toxic. For the revolutionary forces fighting the SAC, reviving the agreement is a political impossibility.
The future of peace in Myanmar, therefore, cannot be a resuscitation of the NCA. Any viable process must be built on a new, more inclusive paradigm that acknowledges the profound political transformations that have occurred since 2021. It must recognize the central role of the National Unity Government (NUG), the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), and the broad-based public resistance that has fundamentally and permanently altered the country’s political and military landscape. True peace will only be possible when it is negotiated by all the actors who now define the struggle for Myanmar’s future.
