Introduction
The coup junta’s post-election peace activities have significantly intensified during the 100-day plan. In particular, the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) has been continuously holding separate meetings not only with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) but also with powerful EAO groups outside the NCA. This situation raises the question of whether it signifies a revitalization of Myanmar’s peace process or a shift in the junta’s political and security management strategy.
The Expansion of Peace Talks and NSPNC’s New Steps
From June to early August 2026, the NSPNC continuously met with at least nine individual Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in Nay Pyi Taw. Additionally, informal meetings were held with the 7 EAO Alliance (NCA-S EAO), an alliance of ethnic armed organizations that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). On June 4th, the NSPNC met with the Shanni Nationalities Unity Congress (SNUC/SNA),[1] and on June 12th, with the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).[2]
In July, meetings were successively held with the New Mon State Party (NMSP),[3] the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC),[4] the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA),[5] the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA),[6] the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU),[7] the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP),[8] and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) (AM).[9] On August 3rd and 4th, discussions were held for two consecutive days with the United Wa State Party (UWSP)[10], and a delegation led by the UWSP Vice Chairman also met with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing.
These events indicate that the scope of the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC)’s engagements is no longer limited to Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory groups but has expanded to include non-NCA ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Specifically, the initiation of communication and negotiations with groups that have not signed the NCA suggests that the military regime’s current peace strategy no longer solely relies on the NCA as the foundational framework for engagement.
However, this does not mean that the NCA has become completely irrelevant. On the other hand, the NSPNC held a two-day workshop on reviewing the peace process with the 7 EAO Alliance (NCA-S EAOs) on July 20 and 21.[11] Therefore, the military council’s current approach to peace is to implement a strategy of simultaneously maintaining the NCA and expanding individual relationships with groups outside the NCA. This is an important change in the 2026 peace movement.
Moving from the NCA Framework to Bilateral Engagement
In Myanmar’s peace process, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was previously a primary framework for political negotiations. However, an analysis of post-election meetings reveals a growing prominence of separate, bilateral discussions with individual groups over the NCA-centric collective negotiation model.
This approach may offer certain advantages for the military junta. The varied political backgrounds and stances of each Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) that met with the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) encompassing their political objectives, military strength, territorial control, allied relations, and regional interests — is a significant factor to consider within the current peace movement. Engaging with groups individually, rather than under a single framework, allows for the separate handling of diverse interests and needs.
While individual negotiations may temporarily de-escalate some conflicts, they do not automatically create a political framework capable of collectively resolving Myanmar’s fundamental political issues such as power-sharing, the establishment of a federal union, self-determination, and security guarantees.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to view the current meetings not as a revitalization of the peace process, but rather as a restructuring of the dynamic relationship between the military junta and the EAO groups.
The Need to Distinguish Between Meeting and Political Agreement
In analyzing the current peace process, a point that requires special attention is that “meeting” and “agreeing” should not be considered to have the same political meaning. The fact that some ethnic armed organizations, including the New Mon State Party, have met with the NSPNC makes it difficult to say that these organizations have accepted the military junta’s political path. Similarly, the military junta’s ability to meet with an organization does not necessarily mean that it has established political influence over that group.
For these organizations, dialogue can also be a political channel utilized to reduce regional risks that cannot be mitigated through other means, to directly present their organizational interests and political stance, and to prevent communication channels from being closed off. Even the National League for Democracy (NLD), which holds completely different political views from the military junta, has begun to use the term “all-inclusive dialogue channel.”[12]
It is therefore incorrect to conclude that an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO)’s political stance has changed based solely on a single meeting with the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC). Instead, only the actual political or military changes that occur on the ground after such a meeting can determine if an organization’s political stance has shifted.
Therefore, in evaluating the meeting between the NSPNC and the New Mon State Party on July 2nd, it is necessary to continue monitoring not merely whether a meeting occurred, but rather what topics were discussed, what commitments were made, and how the New Mon State Party’s political and security stance changes following the meeting.
Conclusion
The continuous meetings of the NSPNC in 2026 indicate the emergence of a new dynamic in Myanmar’s peace process. Specifically, the expansion of engagement to include groups outside the NCA, while maintaining relationships with NCA signatories, reflects a shift in the military council’s approach to peace. While meetings may be the beginning of peace, meetings alone do not constitute peace. Only when discussions move towards political agreements, an inclusive political framework, and implementable mechanisms can the current steps be considered a revitalization of the peace process.
Until that stage is reached, the military regime’s peace initiatives are merely a political strategy aimed at controlling the intensity of the conflict and managing the political and security situation to prevent further deterioration, rather than a definitive resolution to the conflict.
[1] NSPNC, June 4, 2026: Meeting between the National Unity and Peace Restoration Coordination Committee and the Shanni Nationalities Unity Organization., https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-SNA-up.pdf
[2] NSPNC, June 12, 2026: Meeting between the National Unity and Peace Restoration Coordination Committee and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-SSPP-news12-6-26-V1.pdf
[3] NSPNC, July 2, 2026: The National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee met with the New Mon State Party (NMSP). https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-NMSP-news2-7-26.pdf
[4] NSPNC, July 6, 2026: Meeting between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army – Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC). https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-KNU-KNLAPC-news-6-7-26.pdf
[5] NSPNC, July 9, 2026: The National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee met with the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA).https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-DKBA_news-9-7-26.pdf
[6] NSPNC, July 19, 2026: Meeting between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF/TNLA).https://www.nspnc.com/news
[7] NSPNC, July 24, 2026: The National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) met for discussions.https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-LDU_news-24-7-26.pdf
[8] NSPNC, July 27, 2026: Meeting and discussion between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP).https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-ALP_news-27-7-26.pdf
[9] NSPNC, July 31, 2026: Meeting between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) (AM).https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-NSCNK-news-31-7-26.pdf
[10] NSPNC, August 3, 2026: Meeting between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the United Wa State Party (UWSP) (Day 1).https://www.nspnc.com/s/NSPNC-UWSPP-news3-8-26-V1.pdf
[11] NSPNC, July 21, 2026: The second day of the peace process review meeting between the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee and the NCA signatory ethnic armed organizations (NCA-S EAOs) continued. https://www.nspnc.com/s/21-7-2026-Peace-Process-Review.pdf
[12] National League for Democracy, July 20, 2026: Press Release No. (04/2026). https://www.facebook.com/share/p/187t1ovn3G/
