Myanmar’s Political and Military Turning Point 2026

Introduction

The prospect of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release is turning closer as the dream of military leader general Min Aung Hlaing’s becoming a notorious president has been fulfilled. In this quarterly political analysis, the Rehmonnya Institute for Civic Engagement (RICE) intends to describe the statistical data concerning the sacrifices of the public during the spring revolution to facilitate Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency.

 

According to the statement released by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) on March 31, 2026, a total of 7,960 pro-democracy activists and civilians had been killed during the Spring Revolution. This figure covers the period from the beginning of the illegal military coup on February 1, 2021, to March 31, 2026.

Furthermore, a total of 30,715 people had been arrested by the terrorist military junta in connection with movements opposing the illegal coup. Among those arrested, 14,392 had been confirmed as still detained, while 7,883 are still pending verification.

Based on data collected by AAPP, a total of 310 people (154 women and 156 men) were killed by the military junta within the three-month periods from January 1 to March 31, 2026. Their identities have been confirmed, and this number includes 65 children under the age of 18.

This report is divided into five chapters, analyzing five major sectors: military, politics, revolution, coordination, and diplomacy. We invite readers to engage with this comprehensive analysis.

 

Research Methodology

This paper was developed primarily using the Qualitative Analysis method. Data collection was based on Secondary Sources, including reports from independent domestic and international news agencies released in early 2026. It also incorporates official statements from political and revolutionary organizations, leaders’ speeches, interviews, and analyses from political observers.

The collected data were examined using Content Analysis and Causal Analysis techniques to evaluate the primary drivers and consequences behind the events. Furthermore, to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and impartiality of the information, data from various sources were objectively balanced and presented using the Triangulation method.

 

Chapter (1) Military Affairs

Nationwide Conflict Situation

 

 

Over the five-year period from April 1, 2021, to March 31, 2026, a total of 7,287  armed clashes occurred in nationwide, according to data from the Myanmar Peace Monitor. This includes:

• 3,921 armed clashes between the Myanmar Army (MA) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).
• 3,231 armed clashes between the Myanmar Army (MA) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs).
• 135 armed clashes brought out among various  Ethnic Armed Organizations.

Initial analysis of these figures indicates that the PDFs, which emerged after 2021, have conducted more military operations against the Myanmar Army (Junta) than the veteran EROs.

Additionally, what was unpredicted that the armed conflict among the Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs), and the Revolutionary Forces was also brought out across the country through the spring revolution.

 

1.1. Internal Armed Conflicts Among Revolutionary Forces

This study analyzes the internal conflicts that occurred in early 2026 between Myanmar’s Spring Revolution forces and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as incidents involving the surrender of certain leaders. Findings show that:

• Weaknesses in a unified Chain of Command (COC) among organizations.
• Disputes over territory and economic interests.
• External geopolitical influences are primary factors significantly undermining revolutionary strength.

 

Case Studies: Conflicts in Tanintharyi, Northern Shan, and Central Myanmar (Anyar)

• Tanintharyi Region: While the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) was fighting on the front lines, the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA) launched ambush attacks from the rear.
• Northern Shan State: The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), both allies in Operation 1027, were fighting over the control of Kutkai and dominance of the China-Myanmar border trade routes.
• Central Myanmar (Anyar):  disputes brought out over taxation and territorial control  between  local revolution forces under the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) led by Bo Nagar. On February 18, Bo Nagar and some members surrendered to the Military Council.

 

The Root Causes of Conflict

1. Economic & Territorial Interests: Most organizations have prioritized competing for tax collection rights, trade routes, and territorial expansion over fighting the common enemy.
2. Breakdown of Chain of Command (COC): The lack of a cohesive command mechanism has led to “Warlordism” at the grassroots level, resulting in mutual misunderstandings and lawless actions.
3. Geopolitics & External Influence: Particularly in Northern Shan State, China’s influence and its desire for trade route security have become a major force destabilizing alliance relations.

 

Impacts and Consequences

These internal fissures directly benefit the Military Council’s “Divide and Rule” strategy. The surrender of the revolutionary forces extremely impacts on the revolutionary forces internal confidential and movement routes to the junta, that led to increase  the military junta operation over the revolutionary forces .  Furthermore, internal skirmishes, repetitive taxation disputes and human rights violations against locals have significantly decreased public support and trust in the revolution. If a solid alliance and integrated command system are not established quickly through genuine political dialogue, the ultimate goals of the revolution may be jeopardized.

 

 

1.2. Change of the Commander-in-Chief

On March 30, 2026, General Ye Win Oo was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. This change in military leadership could have the following impacts:

 

Strategic Succession and Policy Shifts

In his inauguration speech, the new Commander-in-Chief, General Ye Win Oo, pledged to protect the 2008 Constitution, continue maintaining “Our Three Main National Causes” as a national duty, and proceed with the implementation of the “Standard Army” project initiated by Min Aung Hlaing. Therefore, the fundamental military policies of the Military Council are unlikely to see significant changes and will likely continue along the previous path.

 

Amplified Reliance on Intelligence and Divide-and-Rule Tactics

General Ye Win Oo is the former Chief of Military Security Affairs (Sa Ya Pa) and is often described as the “eyes and ears” of military junta leader general Min Aung Hlaing. He is considered more skillful in intelligence mechanisms and politically “Divide and Rule” tactics than in direct combat operations. He may exploit current cracks within the revolutionary forces—such as the surrender of Bo Nagar and the conflict between the TNLA and MNDAA—to weaken the revolutionary movement using these tactics. This could involve increased propaganda to terminate mutual trust or encouraging more revolutionary leaders to surrender as seen in the case of Bo Nagar.

 

Min Aung Hlaing’s manipulation behind the Scenes

Min Aung Hlaing is preparing to assume the presidency, and the appointment of his close protégé, Ye Win Oo, as the Commander-in-Chief is intended to ensure his continued authority over the military and to secure his rear. General Ye Win Oo is known to be extremely loyal and subservient to Min Aung Hlaing, meaning he will carry out Min Aung Hlaing’s orders precisely and without conflict between the military and the new government.

 

Internal Military Stability and Challenges

General Ye Win Oo graduated from OTS (Officer Training School) Intake 77, making him the first Commander-in-Chief in the history of the Myanmar Army to hail from the OTS. As his experience lies more in intelligence than in operational command, it remains to be seen how much influence he can exert over frontline commanders actually engaged in the battlefield. However, the power balance is being maintained by appointing General Kyaw Swar Linn as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo as the Coordinator of Special Operations.

 

Chapter (2) Politics

The Post-Election Parliament, the New Government, and the Political Transition of the Military Junta

This chapter analyzes the formation of the new parliament and government following the three-phase election held by the Military Council between 2025 and 2026. Findings indicate that this political transition is not a move toward to democratization; rather, it is a systematic and strategic preparation by military leader Min Aung Hlaing to maintain absolute power under a civilian facade.

 

2.1. The Election and the New Parliamentary Landscape

The sham elections organized by the military were held in three stages.

• Major parties such as the NLD and SNLD were barred from participating.
• The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won a landslide victory across the country.
• According to the results, the USDP dominates 89% of the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and 69% of the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities).
• Combined with the 166 military-appointed representatives, the USDP get more than enough seats to form a government.
• Former Brigadier General U Khin Yi, the current USDP Chairman, was appointed Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw.
• Former General Aung Lin Dwe, the former Secretary of the Military Council, was appointed as spoke person of the Amyotha Hluttaw and spoke person of the Union Parliament.

 

2.2. The New Government  

• As expected, the parliament dominated by the military and USDP elected Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as the 11th President of the country.
• He took the oath of office on April 10.
• Former General U Nyo Saw, nominated by the military representative group, became the First Vice President.
• Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye, the USDP Chair of Kayin State elected by the Amyotha Hluttaw, become the Second Vice- President.
• Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye is the first female Vice-President in Myanmar’s history.
• Out of the 30 ministers appointed for 31 ministries, several are key figures who were in leading group of  the military coup.
• Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Tun Aung became the Minister of Defense.
• Lieutenant General Nyunt Win Swe, who led the violent crackdown on protesters in Yangon, became the Minister of Home Affairs.

 

2.3. Min Aung Hlaing’s Strategy for Retaining Power

Despite assuming the title of a civilian government, Min Aung Hlaing formed the Union Advisory Council to maintain his manipulation over the military and continues to control the USDP.

• Since the Constitution does not allow the President to directly command the Commander-in-Chief, he rapidly enacted laws to form the “Union Advisory Council” to prevent a potential coup by the new military chief.
• Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief U Soe Win was appointed Chairman of this council to hold security, international relations, peace, and legislation from behind the scenes.
• To avoid the kind of intra-party power struggle previously seen between U Thein Sein and Thura U Shwe Mann, Min Aung Hlaing replaced top USDP positions with his loyalists.

 

2.4. Political Analysis and Future Outlook

• Political analysts observe that this transition is entirely different from the 2011 transition under U Thein Sein’s government.
• It is merely a change of attire, where old military junta figures change uniforms to civilian character; without genuine policy shifts, the country’s conflicts cannot be resolved.
• While the new government may prioritize stability and economic reconstruction, any consideration of amnesty for political prisoners is viewed purely as a political ploy to gain international “legitimacy”.

 

Conclusion

The government and parliament emerging after the election do not represent the will of the people. They are mechanisms created solely to extend Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s dictatorship. As international sanctions and domestic resistance continue, there is no prospect of the political crisis in Myanmar being resolved under this new government.

 

Chapter (3) Revolution

Analysis of the Formation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) and NUCC’s Transitional Constitution (AFTA) Process

 

This chapter analyzes a significant political movement of the Myanmar Spring Revolution: the formation of the “Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF),” its political declarations, leadership speeches, and observer perspectives. Additionally, it presents the connection between the Transitional Federal Taxation and Administration (AFTA) process, which the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) is preparing to ratify, and the SCEF.

 

3.1. Formation and Political Objectives of SCEF

The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) was initially formed on March 30, 2026, through a collaboration of six organizations: the National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Chin National Front (CNF), and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). SCEF is built upon three main pillars: (1) the State/Federal Unit/EROs Representative Pillar, (2) the People’s Representative Pillar, and (3) the Women’s Representative Pillar. The primary political objectives of the SCEF are to eliminate the military coup, end military involvement in politics, place all armed forces under civilian government authority, completely abolish the 2008 Constitution, draft a new constitution, and implement transitional justice.

 

3.2. Perspectives of the Leaders

NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La led the announcement of the SCEF, describing it as a vital political milestone after five years of the Spring Revolution and emphasizing it as a more unified political-military alliance. KNU Chairman Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win explained that the council is fundamentally structured on the three pillars of States/EROs, the People, and Women’s representation. KNPP Chairman Khoo Oo Reh stated that while the council has initiated with six organizations, efforts will be made over the next 60 days to include other appropriate stakeholders. CRPH Chairman U Aung Kyi Thein pointed out that this collective is a firm commitment to building a new Federal Democratic Union by permanently abolishing the 2008 Constitution. CNF Chairman Pu Zin Cung urged the people, who are the original owners of sovereignty, to continue fighting until the end of the military dictatorship. Finally, Union Prime Minister Mann Win Khaing Than encouraged marching until the revolution succeeds with patience, cautioning against internal and external threats that could destroy mutual unity.

 

3.3. NUCC’s Transitional Constitution (AFTA) Process

 On March 31, 2026, marking the fifth anniversary of the ratification of the Federal Democracy Charter, the NUCC announced that it would soon finalize the “Transitional Constitution (AFTA)”. The AFTA process represents the “Interim Constitutional Arrangements” according to the roadmap in Part (1) of the Charter, with a goal to complete it within the first six months of 2026. NUCC council member U Toe Kyaw Hlaing stated that only a small portion of the drafting remains, and it will be confirmed as an initial draft after further discussions with council members.

 

3.4. Analytical Perspectives

According to analyst Igor Blazevic, the SCEF is not a sudden emergence but rather an evolution of the collective revolution. He analyzes that it appeared at a timely moment to reject the military council’s attempts to form a sham “elected government” and to counter pressures for a bilateral ceasefire that would allow Min Aung Hlaing to retain power. However, Myanmar political researcher Dr. Sai Kyi Zin Soe questioned the absence of “Shan Major Players” such as the TNLA, MNDAA, and SSPP/SSA, who hold significant territorial and political influence in Northern Shan State and are closest to China. Furthermore, he suggested monitoring with skepticism whether this new platform might lead to the exclusion of the NUG if a negotiation path eventually emerges, given the absence of the NUCC’s previous roles in this structure.

 

Conclusion

The formation of the SCEF and the preparations to finalize the NUCC’s AFTA represent significant new political and legal strategic steps for the Myanmar Spring Revolution. As the military council attempts to establish a sham government as its political exit, revolutionary forces have reorganized to integrate political, military, and administrative mechanisms more tightly. Nevertheless, the primary challenge remains for the SCEF regarding how to attract and mobilize the ethnic armed groups that are not yet involved.

 

Chapter (4) Coordination

The Role of the Political Coordination Body (PCB), the “Middle Path,” and Analytical Critiques

 

 

This chapter analyzes the “Middle Path” negotiation strategy of the Political Coordination Body (PCB), which emerged concurrently with calls for the Union Parliament. Findings indicate that while the PCB positions itself as a “Third Force” seeking solutions through political dialogue rather than armed struggle, it faces intense criticism. These critiques stem from the historical lack of sincerity from the military dictatorship and the concern that this path deviates from the revolutionary forces’ objective of “military victory”.

 

4.1. Political Demands of the PCB

The Political Coordination Body (PCB) was formed with the aim of resolving the country’s fundamental problems and building a Federal Democratic Union. It is led by SNLD Chairman Sai Nyunt Lwin, 88-Generation student leader U Mya Aye, and ANP Chairman U Thar Tun Hla. On March 31, the group released a nine-point position statement. Their primary demands include the release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, the cessation of forced conscription, and the convening of “political dialogues” involving all relevant stakeholders.

 

4.2. A Negotiation Concept Beyond the NCA

Regarding the PCB’s negotiation concept, U Mya Aye explained that current conflicts have expanded and the aspirations of ethnic nationalities have risen significantly. He analyzed that these issues can no longer be resolved using the old 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) framework. He emphasized that instead of strictly adhering to a single framework, the situation must be approached with a direct focus on “building a genuine Federal Democratic Union”.

 

4.3. Analysis of the PCB’s Political Role

The political role of the PCB can be analyzed through three key aspects based on its current stance and activities:

1. Standing as a Third Force: At a time when direct dialogue between the two extremes of the conflict—the military junta and the revolutionary forces—is difficult, the PCB seeks to create a “Third Space” and act as a mediator.
2. Seeking a Pragmatic Exit Strategy: The group aims to facilitate a “Political Exit” through a “Middle Path” that allows for mutual compromise when military solutions alone appear difficult.
3. Alignment with International Norms: Since its approach mirrors the “dialogue” path consistently demanded by ASEAN and the United Nations, the PCB may position itself as a diplomatic intermediary between international and domestic spheres.

 

4.4. Critiques of the Negotiation Path

Observers have strongly criticized the “Middle Path” proposed by the PCB for its focus on political dialogue. A primary concern is the total lack of trust in the military; history from the Ne Win era to the Min Aung Hlaing era proves that peace and political dialogues with military dictators have never succeeded. Critics argue that negotiating with a military that lacks political will and sincerity is merely “daydreaming”. Furthermore, there is a risk of deviating from the revolutionary goal; such talk of dialogue could distract from the Spring Revolution’s core mandate of “military victory”. Critics warn that pursuing negotiation tables instead of applying military pressure to defeat the common enemy could diminish the momentum of the revolution. Practical alternatives, such as building robust alliances like the K3C+, AA, SSPP, and RCSS, and implementing political roadmaps like the AFTA, are suggested as more effective than “imaginary dialogues”.

 

Conclusion

The PCB, led by U Mya Aye and U Sai Nyunt Lwin, has clearly emerged as a Third Force utilizing a “Middle Path negotiation strategy” that emphasizes diplomatic dialogue to reduce armed conflict. However, due to the military’s historical lack of sincerity and the “total eradication” conviction held by current revolutionary forces, this path remains extremely difficult to implement on the ground. It will likely continue to face criticism for potentially undermining the main objective  of the  revolution.

 

Chapter (5) Diplomacy

International Responses to the New Min Aung Hlaing’s Government and Diplomatic Analysis

 This chapter analyzes the international community’s responses to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who assumed the presidency following the Military Council’s post-election period in 2025-2026, and his new government. Findings indicate that international stances toward Myanmar’s new political landscape are polarized into two extremes. While an alliance of nations led by China and Russia has provided recognition and support, the United Nations and Western countries continue to withhold legitimacy and maintain opposition through sanctions.

 

5.1. The Military Government’s Political Transition and Diplomatic Objectives

Military leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was elected by the parliament as Myanmar’s 11th President on April 3 and took the oath of office along with his new cabinet on April 10. Political analysts claim that this transition from military uniform to a civilian government is an attempt to alleviate international pressure, rebuild diplomatic relations, and secure political legitimacy. However, at least 15 out of the 30 Union Ministers appointed by Min Aung Hlaing are individuals already on the sanction lists of the United States, the European Union (EU), and Great Britain.

 

5.2. Recognition and Support from Allied Nations

Congratulatory messages regarding Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency were sent by countries including China, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Nicaragua, as well as the King of Cambodia. China was the first country to recognize Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency. On April 6, the Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, H.E. Ms. Ma Jia, met with President Min Aung Hlaing to personally deliver a message from Chinese President Xi Jinping. Their discussion primarily focused on bilateral cooperation, border stability, and the reopening of trade routes. Similarly, Russian President Putin sent a message, and the Director General of the Russian State Space Corporation (Roscosmos) also sent a congratulatory note regarding cooperation in the space sector. The presidential inauguration ceremony on April 10 was attended by ambassadors and charges d’affaires from 23 countries, including high-level representatives from China, Russia, Belarus, Cambodia, and Thailand, indicating a degree of diplomatic support.

 

5.3. Opposition and Sanctions from the United Nations and Western Nations

While Eastern bloc nations showed support, the United Nations and Western countries clearly demonstrated their non-recognition of the new government. As of April 2, the United Nations’ list of heads of state continues to recognize only President U Win Myint and Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as the official leaders of Myanmar. Additionally, U Kyaw Moe Tun remains as  Myanmar Ambassador to the UN. The United States, Great Britain, the European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia continue to impose sanctions on the military Junta groups , while activists have called for the international community to reject this attempt at gaining legitimacy through the instrumentalization of an election.

 

5.4. Demands for Accountability by International Human Rights Organizations

Amnesty International and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) have strongly pointed out that fabricated titles and a change from military uniforms to civilian character do not absolve individuals of war crimes and crimes against humanity. SAC-M further urged for the swift transfer of Min Aung Hlaing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution and called on the international community to cut off the military’s access to weapons and aviation fuel.

 

Conclusion

Although Min Aung Hlaing’s post-election transition to a civilian government gained diplomatic recognition from allied nations like China and Russia—driven by geopolitical and economic interests—it failed to secure any legitimacy from the United Nations and Western nations that uphold democratic standards. Consequently, the Min Aung Hlaing government continues to face a legitimacy crisis on the international diplomatic front, alongside threats of international criminal accountability, in addition to domestic instability.

Conclusion

• The first three months of 2026 marked a significant turning point in Myanmar’s political and military history. The military junta attempted to transition into a civilian government through sham elections, while on the revolutionary side, new political formations emerged alongside internal conflict and armed clashes among various groups.
• Leveraging the results of these fraudulent elections, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of Myanmar’s 11th President on April 3, 2026. He transferred the position of Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services to his loyal protégé, General Ye Win Oo, while systematically arranging the transition to maintain manipulation over the new military chief from above.
• While nations such as China and Russia recognized and supported the new president, the United Nations, Western countries, and international human rights organizations completely rejected this transition. They firmly asserted that he must remain accountable to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes. It is evident that this shift is not a genuine policy change but merely an act to extend the lifespan of a one-man dictatorship under the guise of a “civilian government”.
• On the other hand, it is disheartening to observe that after five years of revolution, instead of focusing on the common enemy, internal conflict for territory control  and economic interests among revolutionary forces has intensified.
• While new political strategies have emerged on the revolutionary side to counter the junta’s political maneuvers, two distinct paths—the SCEF and AFTA routes—exist. Simultaneously, the “Political Coordination Body (PCB)” led by U Mya Aye and U Sai Nyunt Lwin has appeared, calling for inclusive political dialogues. However, this approach faces severe criticism for potentially deviating from the revolution’s goal of “military victory” and is viewed as unlikely to succeed due to the military’s lack of sincerity.
• China has increasingly interfered in Myanmar’s internal affairs, more than ever before, to implement its “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” projects and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). In conclusion, by exploiting the vulnerabilities of both the desperate military council and interest-seeking EAOs, China is systematically incorporating Myanmar as its “Satellite State”.
• The political landscape of Myanmar in 2026 revolves around three axes: “the junta’s facade of transition, the internal fragmentation of revolutionary forces, and excessive foreign intervention (particularly from China)”.
• Although the junta seeks legitimacy through fake elections, it will not escape from the crisis due to international sanctions and domestic resistance. However, if revolutionary forces fail to promptly address internal economic and territorial disputes and maintain discipline, they will lose public trust and severely damaging the momentum of the revolution.
• Therefore, it is urgently necessary for revolutionary forces to implement a solid union and political agreement (such as AFTA) as quickly as possible and focus solely on the abolition of the military dictatorship, their common enemy.

 

 

 

References

 

• Associated Press. (2026, February 19). A resistance leader in Myanmar turns himself in to the army. AP News.
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• BBC News Myanmar. (2026, March 14). ကွတ်ခိုင် – မဟာမိတ်မှ တိုက်ပွဲသို့ [Kutkai: From alliance to battle].
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• (2026, March 31). တိုင်းပြည်၏ အရင်းခံပြဿနာများ ဖြေရှင်းရန် PCB အဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်း [PCB formed to resolve the country’s fundamental problems].
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• Myanmar Now. (2026, March 30). ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီးရဲဝင်းဦး တပ်ချုပ်ဖြစ်လာ [General Ye Win Oo becomes the Commander-in-Chief].
• Myanmar Now. (2026, April 10). စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ကိုယ့်ကိုယ်ကိုယ်ခန့်အပ်သည့် သမ္မတရာထူးအတွက် ကတိသစ္စာပြု [Military leader Min Aung Hlaing takes oath for self-appointed presidency].
• People’s Spring. (2026, March 30). ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုက​ရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုပေါ်ထွန်းရေးဦးဆောင်ကောင်စီ- SCEF တည်​ထောင်​ကြောင်း​ကြေညာပွဲမှ မိန့်ခွန်း​ကောက်နှုတ်ချက်များ [Excerpts from the declaration of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union – SCEF].
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• Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN). (2026, February 26). BO NAGAR’S SURRENDER: Challenges and lessons for Myanmar’s resistance forces. SHAN.
• The Irrawaddy. (2026, February 18). Resistance infighting erupts in Sagaing as PDF attacks BNRA.
• The Irrawaddy. (2026, March 18). ရှမ်းမြောက် ညီနောင်အချင်းချင်း သေနတ်ပြောင်းလှည့်ခြင်း နောက်ကွယ် [Behind the Brotherhood turning guns on each other in Northern Shan].
• Voice of Myanmar (VOM). (2026, April 4). သမ္မတဖြစ်လာတဲ့ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ကို နိုင်ငံခြားတိုင်းပြည်တချို့နဲ့ တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်၊ ပါတီ၊ အသင်းအဖွဲ့တွေ ကြိုဆို [Foreign countries, ethnic armed groups and political parties welcome newly elected President Min Aung Hlaing].