The primary objective of this essay is to analyze why the Junta’s election fundamentally lacks legitimacy, and how the severe domestic opposition to this electoral farce has shifted Myanmar’s political trajectory away from restoring the old system under the 2008 Constitution and toward establishing a new Federal Democratic Union.
Introduction: The Junta’s Deception
The Myanmar Military Junta, which seized power against the will of the people in 2021, has announced plans to hold a general election tentatively scheduled to begin in December 2025 (Wikipedia, 2025). This action is met with unified and categorical rejection from domestic political forces fighting for democracy, including the National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Their firm stance clearly demonstrates that this planned electoral exercise is not a path toward genuine political transition, but rather a sham election designed to perpetuate the Military Junta’s grip on power.
The primary objective of this essay is to analyze why the Junta’s election fundamentally lacks legitimacy, and how the severe domestic opposition to this electoral farce has shifted Myanmar’s political trajectory away from restoring the old system under the 2008 Constitution and toward establishing a new Federal Democratic Union.
1. The Concept of a Façade Democracy
According to political scientists, the concept of Façade Democracy or Electoral Authoritarianism refers to a system that utilizes the appearance of democratic institutions (such as elections) but systematically suppresses civil liberties and completely bans genuine contestation, all with the intent of maintaining autocratic rule (IDEA, n.d.); (Thompson & McCarthy, 2019).
The Myanmar Military Junta’s 2025/2026 election perfectly exemplifies this model. The Junta is merely striving to project an image of legitimacy (USIP, 2022). This election comprehensively violates all essential criteria for electoral integrity, including the rule of law, party registration, and freedom of campaigning (Fulcrum, 2025). The Military Junta is less concerned with maintaining international credibility than with establishing the raw political control necessary to counter the unprecedented internal armed resistance (Fulcrum, 2025).
2. Systematically Engineered Mechanisms
The Myanmar Military Junta has employed systematically engineered institutional and legal mechanisms to predetermine a favorable outcome. These actions are the core evidence proving the election’s illegitimacy.
Key Factors Undermining Fairness:
- Institutional Manipulation and Control: The Military Junta invented a new interim governance system, such as the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), which remains subordinate to the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), the body fully controlled by the military (Thiha, 2025). Furthermore, the Union Election Commission (UEC), reappointed by the Junta, does not function as an independent body but as a coercive tool to implement the military’s agenda (Fulcrum, 2025).
- Elimination of Major Opposition: The National League for Democracy (NLD), the winner of the 2020 election, was dissolved along with 40 other political parties for failing to register under the new Political Party Registration Law (PPRL) (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Additionally, political leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint were disqualified from participation after being convicted of crimes (Wikipedia, 2025). This pre-clears the path for the military’s proxy parties to secure a victory quota (Crisis Group, 2024).
- Repression and Draconian Laws: The Junta enacted a law threatening the death penalty for anyone who opposes or disrupts the election (International IDEA, 2025). Furthermore, imposing martial law in 63 opposition strongholds mere hours after the state of emergency ended shows the Junta’s intent to perpetuate repression rather than relinquish power (International IDEA, 2025).
The Military Junta lacks both constitutional and popular legitimacy because its leader, Min Aung Hlaing, holds power solely by force and has never been popularly elected (UN Special Rapporteur, 2023).
Conclusion on Legitimacy: The points above clearly prove that the 2025/2026 election is not a realistic path to political transition but a sham process intended to cement the Military Junta’s continued control (USIP, 2022); (Crisis Group, 2024).
3. The Resistance’s Rejection and the Political Shift
The cohesive and resolute opposition from domestic political forces against this sham election has had significant consequences, fundamentally altering the political conflict in Myanmar.
3.1. Political Rejection and Consolidation of the United Front
The Joint Anti-Sham Election Working Committee of the NUG/NUCC strongly condemned the election as a “fraudulent invitation” and a “meaningless action” aimed at prolonging dictatorship (NUG/NUCC, 2024). Furthermore, a 2024 survey indicated that approximately 93 percent of Myanmar citizens hold a favorable opinion of the NUG, highlighting the Junta’s profound lack of popular support (CFR, 2025).
3.2. Military Blockade and Territorial Denial
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), particularly groups like the Karen National Union (KNU), have publicly deemed the election a “sham to benefit the Myanmar Tatmadaw” (CNI Myanmar, n.d.) and have vowed to actively prevent voting in their controlled territories (ICTJ, n.d.). The significant territorial gains made by resistance forces, especially after Operation 1027 (Crisis Group, 2024), mean the Junta can only proceed with elections in approximately one-third of the nation’s townships (Stimson Center, 2024); (Channel News Asia, n.d.). This inability to conduct a nationwide vote is a practical demonstration of the Junta’s diminishing power.
This combined political rejection and military denial ensures that the election process fails both the normative test (democratic credibility) and the operational test (effective control).
4. Redirecting the Path toward Federal Democracy
The rejection of the Military Junta’s sham election has fundamentally changed the course of the political struggle. The goal of the revolutionary forces is no longer merely the “restoration” of the flawed pre-coup democracy, but the fundamental “re-making” of Myanmar politics (Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2024).
This transformation is institutionalized in the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), which was endorsed by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) (IDEA, 2022); (NUCC, n.d.). The FDC’s primary objectives are clear: to eradicate all forms of dictatorship, completely abrogate the 2008 Constitution, and build a Federal Democratic Union based on equality and collective leadership (CRPH Myanmar, 2021).
Conclusion: Protracted Conflict and the Future Trajectory
The international community, following the urging of the UN Special Rapporteur, must adhere to a strict policy of non-recognition of this sham election. Furthermore, concerted international action is necessary to block the Military Junta’s access to vital resources, including funds and arms.
The Myanmar Military Junta’s planned 2025/2026 election is clearly a politically manufactured process—a textbook Façade Democracy. It is not a path to stability but a scheme intended only to rationalize the Junta’s continued brutality and generate a flimsy appearance of legitimacy (USIP, 2022); (SAC-M, 2024). The unified rejection by the domestic resistance ensures that any attempt to proceed with the election will likely lead to a continuation and potential escalation of conflict (Crisis Group, 2024); (CFR, 2025).
The international community, following the urging of the UN Special Rapporteur (UN News, 2023), must adhere to a strict policy of non-recognition of this sham election. Furthermore, concerted international action is necessary to block the Military Junta’s access to vital resources, including funds and arms (Justice For Myanmar, n.d.).
In summary, the revolutionary coalition’s rejection of the Military Junta’s fraudulent election has decisively pushed Myanmar’s political future toward a new constitutional structure based on the Federal Democracy Charter, confirming the definitive end of the 2008 constitutional system.
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